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In June 2010, an 870 lbf Space Shuttle Orbiter Reaction Control System Primary Thruster 
experienced an unintended shutdown during a test being performed at the NASA White Sands 
Test Facility. Subsequent removal and inspection of the thruster revealed permanent deformation 
and misalignment of the thruster valve mounting plate. Destructive evaluation determined that 
after three nominal firing sequences, the thruster had experienced an energetic event within the 
fuel (monomethylhydrazine) manifold at the start of the fourth firing sequence. 
The current understanding of the phenomenon of intra-manifold explosions in hypergolic 
bipropellant thrusters is documented in literature where it is colloquially referred to as a ZOT4
Converse to the typical ZOT failure mechanism, the failure of this particular thruster was 
determined to be the result of liquid oxidizer being present within the fuel manifold. Whereas the 
root cause of the failure was a leaking oxidizer valve, there were contributing factors that were 
characteristic of a typical ZOT reaction including: ambient pressure, horizontal thruster 
. 
The typical ZOT scenario involves operation of a thruster in a gravitational field with 
environmental pressures above the triple point pressure of the propellants. Post-firing, when the 
thruster valves are commanded closed, there remains a residual quantity of propellant in both the 
fuel and oxidizer (nitrogen tetroxide) injector manifolds known as the “dribble volume”. In an 
ambient ground test configuration, these propellant volumes will drain from the injector 
manifolds but are impeded by the local atmospheric pressure. The evacuation of propellants from 
the thruster injector manifolds relies on the fluids vapor pressure to expel the liquid. The higher 
vapor pressure oxidizer will evacuate from the manifold before the lower vapor pressure fuel. 
The localized cooling resulting from the oxidizer boiling during manifold draining can result in 
fuel vapor migration and condensation in the oxidizer passage. The liquid fuel will then react 
with the oxidizer that enters the manifold during the next firing and may produce a localized high 
pressure reaction or explosion within the confines of the oxidizer injector manifold. The typical 
ZOT scenario was considered during this failure investigation, but was ultimately ruled out as a 
cause of the explosion. 
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configuration, and a gravitational field. Additional contributors to the failure were identified that 
were not previously associated with a ZOT event, including local temperature conditions and 
sufficient leakage time to allow for propellant accumulation. In conjunction, these factors 
established conditions that allowed liquid oxidizer to pool in the combustion chamber after the 
last nominal thruster firing. As the volume of liquid oxidizer in the chamber steadily increased, 
migration occurred through the injector and boundary layer cooling holes into the fuel manifold. 
Upon initiation of the subsequent thruster firing, the in-rushing fuel reacted with the liquid 
oxidizer causing an explosion and pressure increase sufficient to induce substantial cracking and 
permanent deformation in the injector. 
The telemetry data collected during the test sequence was analyzed during the failure 
investigation and was used to develop the sequence of events leading to the thruster failure. The 
temperature and pressure data corroborate the root cause, showing an overall thruster 
temperature decrease due to the oxidizer leak. The short dwell times between the first, second, 
and third pulses showed minor effects on the thruster performance while the much longer dwell 
time between the third and fourth pulse had a much larger effect on the thruster performance. 
Figure 1 presents the thruster chamber pressure and the facility oxidizer and fuel manifold 
pressures during the explosive event. The “Chamber Pressure” measurement represents the 
pressure within the combustion chamber of the thruster as a result of the hypergolic propellant 
reaction. The “Fuel Manifold” and “Oxidizer Manifold” measurements represent the respective 
propellant fluid pressures in the distribution lines immediately upstream of the propellant 
isolation valves located on the thruster. The chamber pressure measurement is taken downstream 
of the thruster injector face while the fuel and oxidizer manifold pressure measurements are 
taken upstream of the thruster injector face. The thruster injector face provides a pressure 
boundary between the chamber and the propellant manifolds such that dynamic response of the 
system can be identified by interpreting the propellant pressure and chamber pressure responses. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Pressure Data Observed During Thruster L1L Failure. 
 
By comparing the thruster chamber pressure and the facility oxidizer and fuel manifold 
pressures during the explosive event, it was clear that the energetic event occurred within the fuel 
manifold as evidenced by the significantly higher pressure spike. The oxidizer pressure does not 
appear anomalous, and the resultant chamber pressure is unusually low. Had the explosive event 
occurred within the thruster chamber, the chamber pressure measurement would have indicated 
the rapid increase. Likewise, the oxidizer manifold shows no indication of higher than expected 
pressure at startup which would be characteristic of a typical ZOT event. 
Extensive non-destructive and destructive evaluation of the thruster was performed to 
characterize the failure mechanism. Detailed maps of the damaged regions of the injector were 
developed, with scanning electron microscopy and metallography performed to determine the 
individual modes of fracture within each specific region of damage. It was determined that all of 
the fractures observed in the thruster injector were the result of a single rapid overload event. All 
materials of construction were determined to meet specification requirements, and no evidence 
of fatigue, intergranular cracking or other subcritical cracking mechanisms were found that 
would contribute to the failure. 
This paper documents the failure analysis and lessons learned from this unique and previously 
undocumented failure mechanism. 
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A ground test of an 870 lbf Shuttle reaction control thruster experienced and unplanned 
failure. Inspection of the thruster found significant deformation of the fuel manifold closure 
with obvious cracking. Further investigation determined than an explosive event occurred 
within the fuel manifold. The explosion occurred because of liquid oxidizer present in the 
fuel manifold. The oxidizer in the fuel manifold failure mechanism was previous 
undocumented and in contrast to the typical intra-manifold explosion mechanism where fuel 
is present in the oxidizer manifold. 
Nomenclature 
lbf = pounds force 
I. Introduction 
The Space Shuttle Reaction Control System (RCS) is a pressure fed hypergolic propulsion system using 
monomethylhydrazine (MMH) as the fuel and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as the oxidizer. There are three RCS on 
each Shuttle, one in the forward module and one in each of the two Orbiter Maneuvering System (OMS) pods at the 
aft. The Forward RCS (FRCS) contains 14 Primary and 2 Vernier thrusters. The two Aft RCS (ARCS) systems each 
contain 12 Primary and 2 Vernier thrusters. The Primary thrusters are rated at 870 lbf vacuum thrust and the Vernier 
thrusters are rated at 24 lbf vacuum thrust. 
 
Ground testing of the thrusters began with system level qualification in 1979. An ARCS structural assembly was 
populated with a compliment of development thrusters and subjected to qualification testing. After completion of the 
qualification test, a Fleet Leader program was implemented in 1989 at the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) in Las 
Cruces New Mexico. The objective of the Fleet Leader program was to provide the shuttle program with a high 
fidelity ground test article for hot-fire and offline system and component tests. This was accomplished by 
performing Mission Duty Cycle (MDC) firings to maintain approximately a 35 percent equivalent mission lead over 
the oldest flight system. Typical MDC tests included propellant loading, propellant conditioning, flight 
representative profile thruster firings, post-fire inspection and evaluation, and component and system functional 
checkouts.
 
1 
As the end of the shuttle program grew closer, it was no longer necessary to complete MDC firings to extend the 
lead over the Shuttle fleet. However, in order to support potential special test requests, the ARCS test article was 
kept in a ready state with regular skills retention hot fire tests performed. The skills retention tests were intended to 
verify the test article and test stand electrical, controls, computer, data acquisition and mechanical systems were 
ready to perform testing. The hot fires also assured personnel were adequately familiar with the test procedures in 
the event a special test would be required. 
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During a RCS skills retention test conducted in June 2010 at the NASA White Sands Test Facility, an 870 lbf 
Primary Thruster experienced an unintended shutdown. Subsequent removal and inspection of the thruster revealed 
permanent deformation and misalignment of the thruster valve mounting plate. Destructive evaluation determined 
that after three nominal firing sequences, the thruster had experienced an energetic event within the fuel manifold at 
the start of the fourth firing sequence. 
 
The current understanding of the phenomenon of intra-manifold explosions in hypergolic bipropellant thrusters 
is documented in literature where it is colloquially referred to as a ZOT4
 
. The typical ZOT scenario involves 
operation of a thruster in a gravitational field with environmental pressures above the triple point pressure of the 
propellants. Post-firing, when the thruster valves are commanded closed, there remains a residual quantity of 
propellant in both the fuel and oxidizer injector manifolds known as the “dribble volume”. In an ambient ground test 
configuration, these propellant volumes tend to drain from the injector manifolds but are impeded by the local 
atmospheric pressure. The evacuation of propellants from the thruster injector manifolds relies on the fluids vapor 
pressure to expel the liquid. The higher vapor pressure oxidizer will evacuate from the manifold before the lower 
vapor pressure fuel. The localized cooling resulting from the oxidizer boiling during manifold draining can result in 
fuel vapor migration and condensation in the oxidizer passage. The liquid fuel will then react with the oxidizer that 
enters the manifold during the next firing and may produce a localized high pressure reaction or explosion within the 
confines of the oxidizer injector manifold. The typical ZOT scenario was considered during this failure 
investigation, but was ultimately ruled out as a cause of the explosion. 
Converse to the typical ZOT failure mechanism, the failure of this particular thruster was determined to be the 
result of liquid oxidizer being present within the fuel manifold. Whereas the root cause of the failure was a leaking 
oxidizer valve, there were contributing factors that were characteristic of a typical ZOT reaction including: ambient 
pressure, horizontal thruster configuration, and a gravitational field. Additional contributors to the failure were 
identified that were not previously associated with a ZOT event, including sufficient leakage and influenced 
temperature conditions. In conjunction, these factors established conditions that allowed liquid oxidizer to pool in 
the combustion chamber after the last nominal thruster firing. 
II. Failure Investigation 
On June 17, 2010, the ARCS Test Stand 301 (TS301) was configured to troubleshoot an anomalous condition of 
the left pod side yaw firing on manifold 1 (henceforth referred to by its position indicator, L1L) and a known good 
down firing thruster, L3D. Three pulses would be performed on each thruster: 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0 seconds, and the 
current traces for each valve would be observed. The harnesses for L1L and L3D were then to be swapped and the 
three pulses repeated to observe if a potential avionics problem followed the L1L thruster or stayed with the facility. 
This would identify where further troubleshooting needed to be performed. 
 
Thrusters L1L and L3D were simultaneously fired with the same three pulse sequence: 0.5 seconds on, 10 
seconds off, 1.0 seconds on, 10 seconds off, and 2.0 seconds on. The firings were performed nominally and no 
anomalies were initially observed. Prior to swapping the harnesses between thrusters L1L and L3D so they could be 
fired again, a visible oxidizer vapor cloud was observed indicating that oxidizer was leaking from thruster L1L. The 
leaking oxidizer created a condition where personnel could not approach the test article to swap the cables. 
 
The test was halted while Engineering discussed a plan to gain access to thruster L1L. Approximately 20 
minutes passed while the decision was made to fire thrusters L1L and L3D again for 2.0 seconds to correct the 
leaking oxidizer valve on thruster L1L. During the leak mitigation firing for L1L, the profile was terminated at 
approximately 0.1 seconds by the facility software sequence due to a redline violation on the L1L flange 
temperature. An unexpected increase in the environmental temperature near thruster L1L was observed and the L1L 
fuel and oxidizer injector temperatures were observed flat lined at 250°F. The decision was made to back out of test 
operations, make the system safe, and perform inspection of the test system. 
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Upon gaining access to the test stand, thruster L1L was found to have melted and disconnected wires, charring 
on metal surfaces, and broken pressure transducer housing. The thruster was removed from the test stand for further 
evaluation and inspection. 
 
Figure 1 shows the facility thermocouple wires that were observed to have charring on the insulation housing, 
denuding of the leads, and wires disconnected from the thermal block. Figure 2 shows the white soot charring 
observed on some metal surfaces of the thruster and Fig. 3 shows the circumferential crack on the pressure 
transducer housing. 
 
 
 
The valve standoff mounting plate, which is normally in a parallel plane to the thruster mounting flange, was 
found to be significantly misaligned. The misalignment indicated that the integrity of the injector may have been 
compromised during the test abort. A chamber weld leak test was performed to check the integrity of the thruster 
injector and audible leaking was observed. The blowing leak was too large to quantify and potentially masked any 
smaller cracks or leaks that might have been present. Further inspection of the chamber weld via borescope revealed 
significant cracking in the closeout weld channel. The crack extended circumferentially for approximately 180°.  
 
Figure 2. Charring noted on metal surfaces. 
(Photo ID WSTF0610E05892) 
 
Figure 1. Charred, denuded, and disconnected 
wires noted on thruster L1L. (Photo ID 
WSTF0610E05896) 
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Figure 4 shows the profile of thruster L1L with the misalignment of the valve mounting plate and thruster 
mounting flange highlighted. 
 
 
 
The nozzle and thruster valve mounting 
plate were cut from the thruster chamber to 
allow for additional visual and radiographic 
inspection of the injector area. A visual 
inspection of the fuel and oxidizer standoff was 
performed and cracking of the injector material 
was noted. Radiographic inspection of the 
chamber was performed to identify other 
potential crack locations and to identify the 
depth and length of the material cracking. A 
map of all the observed injector fracture 
locations, shown in Fig 5., was made to aid in 
the formulation of a chamber sectioning plan. 
 
Figure 5 is a color coded map of the 
cracking found in the thruster during the failure 
investigation. Dashed black lines represent 
sectioning paths. Blue markings represent 
observed or potential cracking in the outer 
parent material of the thruster, external to the 
injector cavities. Green markings represent 
cracking that occurred in the closure weld of 
 
Figure 4. Valve mounting plate 
misalignment relative to the thruster 
mounting flange. (Photo ID 
WSTF0610E05883) 
 
Figure 3. Broken pressure 
transducer housing. (Photo ID 
WSTF0610E05889) 
 
Figure 5. Annotated locations of cracks observed in thruster 
L1L during destructive evaluation. (Photo ID 
WSTF0710E07140) 
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the fuel cavity when the explosive event occurred and over pressurized the cavity. The red and yellow markings 
represent cracks that occurred in the base material between the fuel and oxidizer cavities. The material damage 
represented by the red and yellow cracks caused much discussion within the failure analysis team because the void 
created by the cracks created a fluid path between the two manifolds. Ultimately, it was determined that the cracks 
occurred as a result of the explosion and were not the cause of the explosion. 
 
During the failure analysis, the chamber was carefully cut via Electric Discharge Machining (EDM) to allow for 
inspection of the cracked surfaces. The chamber was further sectioned into smaller pieces to provide access for 
fractographic inspection of the metal surfaces and for metallographic inspection of the thruster base metals. Figure 6 
shows the thruster after the first EDM cut was made to bisect the thruster in the axial direction. Immediately evident 
are the fuel enclosure cracks and plastic deformation of the fuel enclosure. Figure 7 shows the “B” half of the 
thruster with further EDM sectioning to liberate a segment of the fuel enclosure. The fuel enclosure crack surfaces 
were then able to be analyzed. 
A. Failure Analysis 
During the failure investigation, the 
telemetry data collected during the test 
sequence was analyzed and was used to 
develop the sequence of events leading to the 
thruster failure. The test system appeared 
nominal leading up to the first pulse of the 
series. The first pulses of L1L and L3D were 
completed nominally with the chamber 
pressure transducer and both oxidizer and fuel 
manifold pressure transducers reading nominal 
pressures. 
 
At the completion of the first pulse, the 
oxidizer valve on L1L developed a leak. 
Oxidizer was able to leak during the 10 
seconds dwell time between pulses, 
accumulating in the combustion chamber. The 
accumulated oxidizer resulted in a hard start 
and slightly higher than nominal Pc response at 
the start of the second pulse. The higher 
pressure event was isolated to the combustion 
chamber as an elevated pressure response is 
seen by the chamber pressure transducer but 
the oxidizer and fuel manifold pressure 
transducers read nominal pressures. 
  
After the second pulses, the oxidizer 
leaking from L1L flashed to vapor during the 
10 second dwell time before the third pulse as 
the thruster was at elevated temperature from 
the thermal soak back of the two previous 
thruster firings. Because the oxidizer flashed to 
vapor and did not accumulate in the chamber, 
the third pulse resulted in a nominal firing as 
verified from nominal chamber pressure, 
oxidizer, and fuel pressure transducer 
measurements. 
 
Because of the significant oxidizer leakage observed after the third pulses, a dwell time of greater than 20 
minutes occurred before the decision was made to re-fire the thruster to attempt to stop the leak. During that 
extended dwell time, the oxidizer leaked into the L1L pressure chamber, overcame the heat vaporization with 
 
Figure 7. Thruster L1L sectioned by EDM. (Photo ID 
WSTF0810E07402) 
 
Figure 6. Further sectioning of thruster L1L to liberate 
the fuel enclosure. (Photo ID WSTF0810E07581) 
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thermal soak back from combustion subsided and pooled enough liquid to migrate into the fuel injector cavity. At 
the initiation of the fourth pulse, the inrushing fuel reacted with the oxidizer that had leaked into the fuel cavity, 
resulting in an explosive event. The chamber pressure indicated an initial dip in pressure followed by a slight rise 
but failed to ever reach a stable pressure, indicating good combustion was not achieved. The oxidizer manifold 
pressure appeared nominal, but the fuel manifold pressure saw an excessive increase in pressure consistent with an 
energetic event occurring within the fuel manifold. 
 
The “Chamber Pressure” measurement represents the pressure within the combustion chamber of the thruster as 
a result of the hypergolic propellant reaction. The “Fuel Manifold” and “Oxidizer Manifold” measurements 
represent the respective propellant fluid pressures in the distribution lines immediately upstream of the propellant 
isolation valves located on the thruster. The chamber pressure measurement is taken downstream of the thruster 
injector face while the fuel and oxidizer manifold pressure measurements are taken upstream of the thruster injector 
face. The thruster injector face therefore provides a pressure boundary between the chamber and the propellant 
manifolds such that dynamic response of the system can be identified by interpreting the propellant pressure and 
chamber pressure responses. Figure 8 illustrates the notional locations of the pressure measurements with respect to 
the injector face. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the recorded telemetry of the thruster chamber pressure transducer and the facility fuel and 
oxidizer transducers during the first pulse. At the initiation of the firing, the fuel and oxidizer pressures exhibit 
nominal response when the propellant isolation valves open. Chamber pressure response is nominal and reaches 
steady state levels indicative of a good thruster firing. 
 
 
Figure 8. Cross sectional view of thruster L1L with 
pressure measurement locations annotated relative to the 
injector face. 
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Figure 10 shows the recorded telemetry of the thruster chamber pressure transducer and the facility fuel and 
oxidizer transducers during the second pulse. At the initiation of the firing, the fuel and oxidizer pressures exhibit 
nominal response when the propellant isolation valves open. The chamber pressure shows a higher than nominal 
spike at the initiation of the pulse. This elevated pressure is indicative of a hard start where some excess propellant 
remained in the chamber after the previous firing. After the initial pressure spike, the chamber pressure recovers to a 
nominal level and maintains at a nominal steady state level through completion of the firing. 
 
 
 
Figure 11 shows the recorded telemetry of the thruster chamber pressure transducer and the facility fuel and 
oxidizer transducers during the third pulse. At the initiation of the firing, the fuel and oxidizer pressures exhibit 
nominal response when the propellant isolation valves open. Some consideration was given to the oxidizer pressure 
 
Figure 10. Second pulse of thruster L1L, 1.0 s duration. 
 
Figure 9. First pulse of thruster L1L, 0.5 s duration. 
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spike at the initiation of the pulse but after reviewing historical telemetry data, the pressure was determined to be in 
family. Chamber pressure response is nominal and reaches steady state levels indicative of a good thruster firing. 
 
 
 
Figure 12 shows the recorded telemetry of the thruster chamber pressure transducer and the facility fuel and 
oxidizer transducers during the explosive failure event. At the initiation of the firing, the fuel and oxidizer pressures 
initially exhibit nominal response when the propellant isolation valves open. However, the fuel pressure then 
experiences an uncharacteristic spike corresponding to a drop-off of the chamber pressure. From that time onward, 
the chamber pressure fails to reach a nominal level, becomes erratic, and finally declines when the facility abort 
halted the firing profile. Ringing is seen in the fuel and oxidizer supply pressures from the explosive shock and 
resulting water hammer through the system. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Fourth pulse of thruster L1L; facility abort condition at approximately 0.1 s. 
 
Figure 11. Third pulse of thruster L1L, 2.0 s duration. 
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By comparing the thruster chamber pressure and the facility oxidizer and fuel manifold pressures during the 
explosive event, it was clear that the energetic event occurred within the fuel manifold as evidenced by the 
significantly higher pressure spike. The oxidizer pressure does not appear anomalous, and the resultant chamber 
pressure is unusually low. Had the explosive event occurred within the thruster chamber, the chamber pressure 
measurement would have indicated the rapid increase. Likewise, the oxidizer manifold shows no indication of 
higher than expected pressure at startup which would be characteristic of a typical ZOT event. 
 
Other failure scenarios were considered during the investigation, including: material aging, fatigue, design flaws, 
process escapes, corrosion, and embrittlement. A significant amount of effort was spent performing fractographic 
and metallographic inspection of the thruster parent materials and fracture surfaces. The results of the Materials & 
Process (M&P) investigation determined that the thruster crack fracture surface morphologies were consistent with a 
single, rapid tensile overload event. The event originated in the fuel manifold, expanding outward and causing the 
manifold closure to open up and outward. No evidence of preexisting cracks was found. No evidence of fatigue, 
intergranular cracking, or other sub-critical cracking mechanisms was found. No evidence of substandard welds or 
materials was found.
 
3 
Based on the empirical evidence observed during the investigation and the M&P assessment, five specific 
conditions were identified that resulted in the explosive failure of the thruster. The five conditions were: the oxidizer 
leak, the horizontal configuration of the thruster, the 1g environment the thruster was tested at, the significant length 
of time the oxidizer was allowed to leak, and the thermal environment surrounding the thruster. While the leaking 
oxidizer valve was determined to be the root cause of the failure, the other four conditional were necessary 
contributors to the failure. The severity of damage to the L1L thruster unfortunately precluded identifying the reason 
for the leaking oxidizer valve. 
B. Summary 
Although the absolute root cause of the leaking oxidizer valve is not known, the nominal performance of the 
thruster during the previous firings and the results of the metallurgical assessment led to the determination that the 
oxidizer leak was a cause of the failure, not a symptom of a pre-existing failure. Historically, leaking propellant 
valves have been observed, sometimes caused by transient contamination on the valve sealing surface preventing the 
valve from fully seating when closed. In the case of the L1L failure, the valve was allowed to leak unabated for 
approximately 20 minutes after firing for a total of 3.5 seconds over a 23.5 second period. 
 
While the oxidizer valve leaked, the cooling effect of the vapor phase change caused the bulk temperature of the 
thruster injector to reach the critical temperature of the oxidizer. The oxidizer then continued to leak from the 
injector but maintained a liquid state. With the thruster oriented in a horizontal position, a bowl feature is created 
between the injector face and the throat. Since the testing was performed in a 1g environment, the liquid oxidizer 
settled in the chamber bowl and as the level of the liquid increased, began to flow backward into the fuel injector 
passages into the fuel manifold. 
 
After the 20 minute dwell period, the thruster was commanded to fire in an attempt to halt the oxidizer leak. 
When the fuel isolation valve opened and introduced liquid fuel into the manifold, a hypergolic reaction occurred, 
causing a rapid increase in pressure within the fuel manifold. The explosive disassembly of the thruster at the fuel 
manifold closure welds caused an unstable firing as evidenced by the erratic chamber pressure trace. Expectedly, 
there was a significant pressure increase in the fuel manifold and supply lines as observed on the facility pressure 
measurements. Hot gasses from the explosion were expelled outwards from the cracked injector and caused the 
facility flange temperature measurements to become unbounded from their installed positions. 
 
As the facility measurements went open, the firing profile was aborted by the test software and the thruster 
valves were automatically commanded closed, ceasing the firing profile. 
III. Conclusion 
The intra-manifold explosion observed during the L1L thruster firing resulted from oxidizer present in the fuel 
manifold. Previous examples of intra-manifold explosions, known as ZOTS, were observed to have resulted from 
fuel present in the oxidizer manifold. A unique set of conditions were necessary to achieve the non-traditional ZOTS 
failure. 
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The traditional ZOTS phenomenon and this newly documented fuel manifold explosion phenomenon are 
prevented during in-flight operation of the RCS thrusters by the Shuttle fault management system. In a flight 
configuration, thruster L1L would have been made unavailable by the Redundancy Management (RM) system when 
the injector temperature dropped below 65°F due to the oxidizer leak and could not have been fired. Additionally, in 
a reduced gravity flight environment, the leaking oxidizer would not have settled and collected in the thruster 
chamber; rather the liquid would tend to bead and float out of the chamber. However, the cold environment 
associated with flight operations would have also assisted in preventing the accumulation of oxidizer as the leaking 
liquid would freeze as it exited the injector, leaving the thruster as fine crystals or causing the injector to become 
plugged with a solid mass. 
 
For these reasons, no actions were taken to modify the flight operations of the RCS as a result of the ground 
failure of thruster L1L. Sufficient flight rationale existed to continue operations as normal. The act of firing leaking 
thrusters in a ground based test setting was reconsideration as a result of this failure. Ultimately though, as the 
WSTF Fleet Leader program had ended and the end of the Shuttle program directed the decommissioning of the test 
stand, no actions were taken to modify the ground test procedures. 
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